Dear Mr. Pathak,
You are well aware that the motto of Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai is “Yato Dharmastato Jaya” (Sanskrit) or, Where there is Righteousness, there shall be Victory.
Also, as per your MCGM’s self-proclamation, The MCGM is veritably the 'cradle of local self-governance in India'. It embodies the principle of democracy of 'governance of the people, by the people and for the people'. Through the multifarious civic and recreational services that it provides, the MCGM has always been committed to improve the quality of life in Mumbai.
On 30th June, 2007, the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai has once again reinstated itself as the worst possible civic body when it comes to disaster management. The reminiscences of 26th July, 2005 are still vivid in the minds of every one of us. Thousands of schoolchildren were stranded due to flooding and could not reach home for up to 18 hours. The subsequent two days were declared as school and college holidays by the state government. The city region and the suburbs received 944 mm (37.2 inches) (the city and suburbs make up the metropolis). Adding to the chaos was the lack of public information.
Large slum colonies have encroached upon the storm water drains and the Mithi river, which is Mumbai's main river. This resulted in to massive disaster in areas like Kalina and Kurla in 2005. Mithi-river was visited by most of the national as well as state leaders of every party and it was suddenly in the limelight. Last year, just before the monsoon, the Chief Mister proudly announced along with the then MCGM Commissioner Mr. Johnny Joseph that the widening of Mithi-river was complete and Mumbai was ready for any deluge with a “proficient” disaster management of MCGM. But in the end it was just a hoax.
But the point for stoic reflection is the lack of infrastructure and preparedness which has wrecked the life of every citizen of Mumbai during the deluge, which is no longer an amusement for Mumbai since July, 2005 and slowly we are getting use to these inundations every year.
It was believed that the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai was caught unawares on 26th July, 2007 and it uses this garb to hide itself from the embarrassment of its petulant lack of vigilance for a situation like deluge demands. It was symbolized as ‘Vis Major’ which was literally impossible to anticipate.
Now, let us see some historical facts regarding rainfalls in Mumbai. An analysis of the probability of such extreme events and their expected return period based on historical data going back to 1886 for Colaba and 1957 for Santa Cruz reveals that in any year, the probability of 24-hr rainfall exceeding 20 cm is 50% for Santa Cruz and 33% for Colaba. The return period for a 20 cm rainfall over Mumbai is 2 to 3 years (Shyamala, 2005).
On 5 July 1974, Mumbai had received 58 cm in a single monsoon day and the city had taken it in its stride. Just five years ago, on 13 July 2000, Mumbai had recorded exceptionally heavy rains: Vasai 49, Thane 45, Santa Cruz 37 and Colaba 25 cm.
This makes it clear that it was not the rainfall, but the inundation, that was truly unprecedented. Never before perhaps had the metropolis experienced anything like it. Suburban trains normally running at intervals of 3 minutes, came to a grinding halt and 150,000 commuters including schoolchildren got instantly stranded at railway stations. Buses were unable to ply and the roads were bursting to capacity with stagnant northbound traffic. Land lines, mobile phone services and power supply went dead in many areas. Highways connecting the city got blocked and the airport had to be closed. The island city was really marooned.
Had Mumbai received the rainfall of 94.4 cm in a day a century ago, the severity of problems would surely have been much less. The population of Greater Bombay, now called Brihan Mumbai, was less than a million at the beginning of the last century. The mid-century figure was around 3 million. By 2001, the population had grown to almost 12 million. The city has risen vertically, open spaces have dwindled, the arterial roads cannot be widened any further, smaller roads have become car parks, and the drainage systems cannot keep pace with the ever-increasing needs of the metropolis. Many people are literally living on the edge, in areas that are known to be prone to landslides. (Courtesy: IWRS News Letter - November 2005)
Many different reasons have been ascribed to the Mumbai flooding of 26 July 2005. The two main causes cited are: (1) the uncontrolled urbanization of north Mumbai and the destruction of mangroves, and (2) the inadequacy of the existing drainage system. Some of the arguments, and opinions expressed in the media, are qualitative in nature and based on what has been seen to happen. They may even be valid, but they need a critical and objective examination by experts before firm conclusions can be drawn. It is evident that in the process of housing construction and setting up of industries, the waterways that allow the accumulated rain water to drain out have been drastically reduced.
What is, however, debatable is the destruction of mangroves being made out as one of the factors responsible for flooding. There is no doubt that mangroves serve as a vital link in the ecological chain, acting as a buffer between land and ocean, and that destruction of mangroves will disturb the ecological balance. What needs to be considered in detail is the question whether mangroves, while protecting the coastal belts from the impact of waves, could as well impede the outflow of water from the land. Mangrove ecosystems which exist along the Mithi River and Mahim Creek are being destroyed and replaced with construction. Hundreds of acres of swamps in Mahim creek have been reclaimed and put to use for construction by builders. These ecosystems serve as a buffer between land and sea. It is estimated that Mumbai has lost about 40% of its mangroves between 1995 and 2005, some to builders and some to encroachment (slums). Sewage and garbage dumps have also destroyed mangroves. The Bandra-Kurla complex in particular was created by replacing such swamps. The Environment Ministry of the Government of India was informed in the early 1990s that sanctioning the Bandra-Kurla complex (a commercial complex in northern Mumbai) was leading to disaster. No environment clearance is mandatory for large urban construction projects in northern Mumbai. Officials in the environment ministry claimed that it was not practical to impose new guidelines with retrospective effect "as there are millions of buildings".
Antiquated drainage system is one of the prime reasons for these inundations. The present storm-water drainage system in Mumbai was put in place in the early 20th century and is capable of carrying only 25 millimeters of water per hour which was extremely inadequate on a day when 944 mm of rain fell in the city. The drainage system is also clogged at several places.
Only 3 'outfalls' (ways out to the sea) are equipped with floodgates whereas the remaining 102 open directly into the sea. As a result, there is no way to stop the seawater from rushing into the drainage system during high tide.
In 1990, an ambitious plan was drawn to overhaul the city's storm water drainage system which had not been reviewed in over 50 years. A project costing approximately 600 crore rupees was proposed by UK based consultants hired by the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation to study the matter. Implementation of the project would have ensured that rainwater did not flood the streets of Mumbai. The project was planned to have completed by 2002 and aimed to enhance the drainage system through larger diameter storm water drains and pipes, using pumps wherever necessary and removing encroachments. The project, if implemented would have doubled the storm water carrying capacity to 50 mm per hour. The BMC committee rejected the proposed project on the grounds that it was "too costly".
Providing protection from drainage congestion is the responsibility of civic bodies or local authorities which is MCGM in this particular case. Besides the characteristics of the rain storm, many other factors like proximity to rivers and ocean, local topography, traffic patterns, drainage design, housing, population density, all influence the severity of drainage congestion. A vital but tricky consideration in the design of drainage systems is the return period of the “most extreme” rainfall events. Usually an optimum balance has to be struck between over-estimating and under-estimating the risks involved and a major deciding factor is the cost. Population growth and urban development over say the next 100 years are also not easy to visualize and the choice of future projections will have its own impact on the design and cost.
River floods can be predicted because there is considerable time lag between the occurrence of heavy rainfall in the upper catchments and the consequent build-up of the flood flow in the river, and its travel to a downstream area. Such a lead time is not available in case of drainage congestion caused by local rainfall. Also, the propagation of a flood wave in a river channel is easier to compute. Mathematical or physical modeling of city drainage is, from a hydraulics point of view, a far more complex problem. Also required is a parallel system for quantitative prediction of the rainfall amount and rate on a scale that will match the scale of the hydraulic model. As of today, the state of art in these areas is rather primitive. (Courtesy: IWRS News Letter - November 2005)
Two thousand years ago, a great Teacher narrated a parable which made a comparison between wise and foolish builders. The wise person built his house upon a rock while the foolish one built his house on sand. Then the rains came down and the floods went up. The house on the rock firmly withstood the torrents, while the house on the sand came crashing down.
In today's world, there can be no argument against development. No one can be denied the right to a better living. But urban growth has to be controlled and planned on the strong foundations of wisdom, foresight and discipline. Otherwise more disasters may be just waiting to happen. With an annual budget of almost 12,000 Crores, we sincerely hope that Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM) will give us a deluge-free Mumbai and not a Shanghai.
Yours Truly,
For Every Citizen of Mumbai,
Sandesh R. Shukla.
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